Introduction to Developmental and Historical Structuralism Klaus F. Riegel
The following essay introduces structuralism from several different angles.
In the first section of this introduction, the concept of structure (and in extension those of schema, pattern, gestalt, etc.) will be contrasted with that of function (and in extension those of activity, interaction, transformation, etc.). Such a comparison will not merely reconfirm the old dichotomy as introduced into psychology by James and Titchner, but will emphasize the mutual dependency of structure and functions. In this attempt we rely on Piaget's interpretations and, thus, emphasize genetic aspects. Reference will also be given to recent trends in linguistics, especially to Chomsky's transformational grammar.
In the second section, we trace the origin of these ideas to some reformulations in mathematics proposed during the second half of the 19th century by In the fourth section we question, in alliance with modern sociologists and anthropologists, the role of the psychic self as a primary base of knowledge and of psychology as an independent science. Piaget has been criticized for viewing development as emerging, essentially, from within the individual and for failing to give equally strong emphasis to the interactive changes of the socia-historical conditions. Rubinstejn's theory, with which we conclude our presentation, proposed such a dialectic interpretation of a changing organism in a changing world.
Psychology and Linguistics

Early Structuralism
The distinction between structure and function gained its directive influence upon psychology through Titchner. Although previously discussed by James (1890) (see also Ruckmick, 1911) , Titchner (1898) elaborated this distinction in detail and thereby, paradoxically, helped his adversaries in founding functionalism in America (Boring, 1957, p. 555) . Titchner, by drawing an analogy from biology, proposed a threefold distinction.
We may enquire into the structure of an organism, without regard to function--by analysis determining its component parts, and by synthes is exhib i ting the mode of its formation from the parts. Or we may enquire into the function of the various structures which our analysis has revealed, and into the manner of their interrelation as functional organs. Or, again, we may enquire into the changes of form and function that accompany tfue persistence of the organism in time, the phenomena of growth aud of decay. Biology, the science of living things, comprises the three mutually interdependent sciences of morphology, physiology, and ontogeny [1898, p. 449] . negligible importance if any importance at all. As for Titchner, genetic aspects remain neglected. Gestalt psychologists analyze psychic conditions from an "a-historical" point of view. They are concerned, however, with functional aspects which, as introduced by the forerunner of Gestalt psychology, von Ehrenfe1s (1890) , are implied in the so-called "second law of Gestalt."
As commonly expressed, the "first law" stat~s that a Gestalt is more than the sum of its parts, i.e., organizational, structural properties are implied. The "second law" concerns transpositions or transformations through which all parts may lose their absolute positions, though the structural properties are retained, i.e., are kept invariant. Convincing cases of the "second law" are the transpositions of a melody into different keys, or in a more general sense (Le., keeping fewer properties invariant), the variations upon a musical theme. In regard to spatio-visua1 conditions, the perception of a simple object, e.g., a suspended triangle, is subject to ceaseless transformations. Not only does the location, illumination and color of the object change relative to the observer, but also the sensory organs of the observer himself undergo ceaseless transformations produced by their gross and fine movements. Thus, the scientific exploration of perceived patterns is as much an abstraction from the ongoing physical and psychic activities as was the abstraction of constituent elements from these patterns by the preGestalt psychologists. What unaer1ies both these abstractions, and therefore ought to be of main interest to the psychologist, are ceaseless sequences of transformations.
Gestalt psychologists recognized this issue, especially through their investig~tion of the phi-phenomenon. The phi-phenomenon is produced by sWitching two light sources on and off. Dependent upon the rate of switching, the lights are e Lt.hez perceived as alternating discrete stimuli, as two continuously lighted stimuli, or as a connecting lighted line. These investigations have primarily been used in refutation of earlier atomistic viewpoints in that they question the identifiability of discrete sensory elements. They could be used equally well to criticize the preponderance of stimulus patterns.
The investigations of the phi-phenomenon clearly support a transformational or transactional interpretation. The opposite dominated, however, through K~hler's (1920) analysis of the isomorphism between external physical and internal neuroph.ysiological pa t t e rns with its implied priority of the former in the tradition of philosophical realism. A convincing argument for transposition as the key principle has been published by Witte (1960) . More recently, Henle (l972) has thoroughly reviewed Wolfgang KbhLer l s contributions to this discussion.
Cognitive Developmental Psychology
Among present-day psychologists, only Piaget (1970) has drawn a conclusion similar to the transformationists, and has, thereby, reversed the order of the laws of Gestalt psychology. The "law of transposition," now, gains priority over the "law of the Gestalt." As an organism engages physiologically and psychologically in ceaseless transformations, it attains patterns during its internal transitions and attends to patterns as transitional conditions. These pat t.e rns represent momentari.ly objectified states of equilibrium, the organism moves forward through a stream of transactions. In his considerations, Piaget is willing to conclude that "transformations may be disengaged from the objects subject to such transformation and the group defined solely in te~s of the set of transformations [Pf.age t , 1970, pp. 23-24J. II Piaget is, of course, best known for his "stage theory II in which he proposes a fixed sequence of synchronic structures for the characterization of developmental pr~gression. If we take the above quotation seriously, however, development should be characterized by groups of permissible transformations rather than by fixed forms or schemata. Such a notion implies th~t the freedom of transformation is never unlimited. In regard to mathm atical systems, e.g., measurement scales, it implies that basic properties have to be kept "invariant," e s g . , in metric systems the relative distances between points. In Piaget's theory of cognitive development, conditions of invariance are represented as temporary states of equilibrium from which the individual will constantly divert, but to which he will always return.
With this emphasis on transformational processes Piaget ,at the same time, inverts the meaning of structure and function as originally conceived by Titchner. Now structures emerge through continuous transformational activities; they are, in other words, determined by functions. Moreover, structures emerge from within, whereas for Gestalt psychologists they originate from without. In further contrast to these and to most other structuralists, Piaget relates both the concepts of structure and function to genetic interpretations. Structures do not only emerge through transformations but are subjected to continuous changes. The individual's development is characterized by shifts in structures brought about by transformational activities. Thus, Piaget relates all three aspects of Titchner's outline to one another; his theory is structural, functional, and genetic. Development is not characterized any longer as a sequence of synchronic schemata, but by diachronic clusters of transformations.
Linguis tics
Piaget's emphasis upon the connection between structures and transformations directs our attention to some recent developments in linguistics.
More distinctly than in psychology, two major schools in linguistics have been called "structuralists" and "transformationists." The former adopted the methodology of the behaviorists in order to determine the major form classes and their arrangements in the natural language. With their emphasis upon methodological rigor, they share with the behaviorists a disrespect for any notions about underlying organizations, forces or meanings. They initiate their inquiries from and on the surface of the linguistic corpus.
Quite paradoxically, of course, the denotation of these linguists as "structuralists" cannot be transferred to their allies, the "behaviorists, II who, from Titchner's point of view, were regarded as "functionalists. 1I He reserved the label of "structuralism" for his own school of introspective elementarism.
Structuralism, as proposed by Bloomfield (1933) , dominated American linguistics for many decades. Although objections were expressed repeatedly--for instance, Jesperson (1937) claimed that the purpose of a linguistic analysis is "to denote all the most important interrelations of words and parts of words in connected speech • . • • Forms as such have no place in the system (1937, pp. 13 and 104]1I--a major revision was not undertaken until the appearance of Chomsky's transformational grammar.
As for Piaget, Chomsky's (1957 Chomsky's ( , 1959 publications reveal some major changes in his own thinking. He started out with describing alternative models of syntactic structures (1957) and by po1emizing against behavioristic interpretations (1959) . Then he elaborated his syntactic theory (Chomsky, 1965 (Chomsky, , 1968 which is of primary interest for our present discussion. His most r~cent interpretations, nevertheless, are not as radical as those by Piaget (1970) . In contrast to Piaget's transformationism, Chomsky argues at two distinct levels: for grammars of the surface structures of the natural languages and for an underlying universal deep structure. Most of his efforts are directed toward the delineation of the Lat.t er , As this is achieved, attention can shift toward the specification of transformation rules by which the former are derived from the latter. Transformations are thus performed upon given structures and do not attain the priority that Piaget is willing to assign to them. Instead of considering these transformations as the universal basis, they merely operate upon the deep structure to which such a priority is assigned. Not surprisingly, therefore, some of his followers (Lenneberg, 1967; McNeill, 1968 McNeill, , 1970 have identified these universal forms of the deep structure with innate schemata of the organisms, and thus have revitalized the nativism of 19th century psychology. What needs to be done is to relate the transformations to intrinsic activities of the organism but not to their forms.
The concept of "t rans fo rmat Lon," as used by modern linguists, creates as many difficulties as the concept of "structure tl as used by Titchner. Transformations have their well-defined place in the logic and mathematics of numerical systems. As first elaborated by HBlder (1901) and discussed in many different treatises in the behavioral and social sciences (see Stevens, 1951; Coombs, 1964) measurements can be based upon numerical systems of varying complexity, i. e., upon cardinal, ordinal, rational systems, etc.
As their complexity increases (and with it the number of operative prerequisites that have to be fulfilled), the complexity of the transformations that can be imposed upon these systems decreases. Thus cardinal numbers can be subjected to a wide range of transformations, rational numbers only to a few. In other words, with increasing complexity, larger sets of properties have to be kept invariant unless the structure of the whole system is to be invalidated.
Whereas the structure of these numerical systems and their sets of permissible transformations can be specified with precision, the use of the latter term in linguistics is rather ambiguous. Linguistic transformations do not only change the order of items within strings but also basic features of expressions--for example, they change declarative statements into negatives, questions, passives, and vice versa. Since the dimensions of linguistic expressions are difficult to determine and vary from investigation to investigation, linguistic transformations also lack descriptive rigor. In particular. the invariant properties are not spelled out. Indeed, mathematicians seem to emphasize the invariances; linguists point to the modifications brought about by transformations.
Mathematics Theories of Numbers
In discussing some reformulations in mathematical thinking which contributed to the development of modern structuralism, we direct our attention to the work of Cassirer (1910) . As implied in the German title of his book,
The Concepts of Substance and Functions. early philosophizing relied heavily upon the concept of smallest, substantive elements. With the objective basis of these particles taken for granted, the task for philosophy and sciences consisted in analyzing the systematic connections between them. In opposition to such conceptualizations, Cassirer argues for the priority of functional relations or operations, a switch in thinking which characterizes structural interpretations. This shift in conceptualization also occurred in mathematics.
During the early historical periods, at leas.t up to Descartes, mathematics was seen as a reflection of or an ideal abstraction from the~eal world with its substantial particle properties. A major reformulation was brought about
by Leibniz for whom the basis of knowledge did not lie in the reflection and abstraction of ideas themselves but in the relationship between ideas. As a general example of this change in thinking consider the notion of geometrical points and lines. Traditionally, points were taken for granted and, thereafter~notions about their shortest connections, i.e., through straight lines, were derived. Thus, the solution was achieved through operations performed upon these points. Similarly in algebra, the natural numbers, as experienced by counting real objects, were taken for granted. Whenever problems arose, e.g., when a larger number was to be sUbtracted from a smaller one, extensions of the system were introduced, in this case, an extension into the domain of negative numbers. In many other cases, new numbers were intersper~ed between the natural numbers, such as fractional, irrational, and imaginary numbers.
Thereby, the notions of the infinity in extension and in partition of the domain of numbers emerged. But at the same time, it became even more apparent that the prerequisites, which made these developments possible, lie in our full use of operative capabilities rather than in better and better approximations of the range of real objects. In other words, mathematics began to be seen as a system of operations rather than as a reflection of substantive conglomerates. Since the full range of these operations has been hardly explored, many new forms of mathematics could emerge. Developments since the second half of the 19th century have confirmed this possibility, leading to non-Euclidean geometries and to some of the number systems mentioned above.
Related to these developments are changes in the concepts of time and space (Cohen, 1972; Riegel, 1972c) . Traditionally, time had been regarded as finite and discrete; thus, the concept of time was similar to the concept of substance. As the natural number system was extended and as the slots between numbers were filled to a greater and greater extent, the notion of infinity was introduced through induction. Now, instead of emphasizing the periodicity of time, its beginning and its end, an abstract continuum was derived. To Cassirer, however, the question of whether time is discrete or continuous, finite or infinite, relative or absolute depends solely upon the operations selected by the observer and not upon external, nonintellectual criteria.
Cassirer relates our conception of time to the theories of numbers and algebra. Geometry, on the other hand, he relates to the simultaneity and coexistence of several such number systems. Subsequently, also our concept of space can be continuous or discrete, absolute or relative, Euclidean or non-Euclidean. Originally, according to Cassirer, the concept of space was According to Dedekind, our basic conception of numbers is relational.
Thro~gh implicit mental comparisons we derive ordinal numbers. By explication we become able to categorize numbers or items. For example, we might, within a given range, group all those items into a class which are below a certain value a. Items above that value are assigned to a different class.
Following this procedure (the well-known Dedekind "incision") t the criterion itself t~t cannot belong to either of the two classes which it defines.
Therefore t we need to elaborate other operations that will lead to a new numerical system and include the criterion~t i.e. t the system of irrational numbers. By applying these deductive procedures step by step and thereby extending the domain of numbers encompassed, Dedekind and the following generation of mathematicians succeeded in deriving the whole field of mathematics from this basis.
For this purpose it was first necessary to deduce the system of ordinal numbers. This was done by applying Dedekind's procedure repeatedly, thus generating the classes A and B J on the one hand, and C and D on the other.
If there is an element which belongs to the class A of the first incision and to the class D of the second incision t then we would call the first categorization larger and let it follow the second one in a sequence. Thus t a criterion is given which t when applied repeatedly, generates a completely ordered system of numbers.
Dedekind's procedure is based on ordinal judgments. For the derivation of cardinal numbers and categorizations in general--it has been argued by Frege (1903) and Russell (1903) --judgments of equivalence are more fundamental.
Contrary to the traditional conception J according to which numbers are considered as given and t subsequentlYt judged as equivalent or not, it is the goal of their approach to determine an operation of equivalence first t and then to derive sets of equivalent and nonequivalent numbers on the basis of such an operation. As stated by Ere ge , "It is our intention to form the content of an operation which can be expressed in an equation in such a way that there is a number on each side of it . . . . Thus, by means of the familiar concept of equivalence we are to obtain what we have to consider as equal [1903, p. 27] ."
In comparing the approach by Dedekind and Cassirer with that by Frege and Russell, their similarities and dialectic interdependencies need to be emphasized. First, both camps rely on relations--the former, in general, on asymmetric relations of different kinds, the latter on the symmetric relation of equivalence. Second, both emphasize operative, constructive aspects through which complex structures are derived. They neither regard these structures nor the equivalences and relations as given in the external world but as founded in the operations of the organism. Thus, their interpretations are closely in line and anticipate Piaget's cognitive developmental theory. They are at variance, however, with sociocultural theories which assign, at least in part, these operative, constructive or transformational activities to society which, in turn, will determine, at least in part, the activities of the individual. Before we discuss these modern trends, a brief overview will be given of some recent philosophical developments which parallel those in mathematical theory. In particular, we will refer toCarnap's (1928) early work.
Philosophy Positivism and Conventionalism
The philosophical roots of modern structuralism lie in rather unusual grounds which, at first sight, we migh.t not at all connect with such an interpretation. This is due to some common misconceptions about these schools, To Avenarius these structures are arbitrarily selected in about the same way in which rules of a game, such as chess, are being set up. There is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic validity in these systems; their value is dependent upon criteria such as internal consistency, simplicity, and comprehensiveness.
Constructivism
Avenarius' interpretations failed to have a major effect upon the philosophy and the execution of the behavioral and social sciences. His ideas gained considerable importance, however, through .the extensions by the early Carnap (1928) . Accepting the shift from substantive to functional conceptualization (Cassirer, 1910) Cassirer (1910) , that it is not the sensory impression but the sentence (rrSatzrr as related to "setzen," "p r opos Lng'") which alone generates knowledge by making it communicable, social, and human.
There are two basic components upon which individual and scientific knowledge is based: property description and relation description.
A~roperty description indicates the properties which the individual objects of a given domain have, while a relation description indicates the relations which hold between these objects, but does not make any assertion about the objects as individuals. Thus, a property description makes individual or, in a sense, absolute, assertions while a relation description makes relative assertions [Carnap, 1967, p. 19] .
While the present author would take exception to the notion that property descriptions are nonre1ationa1 (see chapter VIII), Carnap's main attention, anyhow, centers around the relation descriptions. Construction of knowledge consists in transforming relation descriptions (which ultimately might have been generated from property descriptions) according to construction rules or constructional definitions .
.••• to construct~out of~,~means to produce a general rule that indicates for each individual case how a statement about a must be transformed in order to yield a statement about ' £ [Carnap, 1967, p. 6 ].
The development of constructivism has been prepared by Poincare's emphasis that knowledge cannot be based upon the "givens" alone, e.g., sensations, but that "only relations between the sensations have an objective value [Poincare, 1902, p , 198 ." For Carriap , this move, although in the right direction, does not go far enough. Scientific knowledge becomes possible only through the systematic explication of the interrelation of relations, i.e., through the study of structures. Ultimately, all knowledge is structural and is removed and separated from its base, the property descriptions or, in Poincare's sense, the relations with objective value.
Within a system of structural description, Carnap distinguishes two kinds of definitions: Ostensive definitions and definite descriptions. The former resemble property descriptions but are stated in relational terms.
Here, " ••• the obj ect which is meant is brough t within the range of perception and is then indicated by an appropriate gesture, e.g., 'That is Mont Blanc' ••• definite descriptions ••• list ••• essential characteristics, but only as many••• as are required to recognize unequivocally the object which is meant within the object domain under discussion," e. g., "Mont Blanc indicates the highest mountain in the Alps," or ••• "the mountain so many kilometers east of Geneva [Carnap, 1928, p. 24] ." While empirical sciences have to incorporate ostensive statements in order to relate to their specialized fields of observations, science will, ultimately, remove itself from this basis through purely formal, structural descriptions. Scientific disciplines differ in the degree to which such transformations have been accomplished. Physics, in certain areas, Can be removed from its ostensive basis. Psychology has not reached such an advanced status. According to Carnap, such "de-subjectivization" will always result in formal structural descriptions. "Each scientific statement can in principle be so transformed that it is nothing but a structural statement [Carnap, 1928, p. 29] ."
An Example of Structural Description
Carnap provides a simple demonstration of structural descriptions, the example of a railroad schedule. From such a record sufficient specifications can be deduced in regard to any point (in this case. station) without going outside of the system. Our own analysis of language and meaning--we believe--represents an equally strong demonstration (see Riegel, 1970 ).
Contrary to common as well as to scientific conceptions, meaning is a relation (or rather a set of relations); concrete experience consists of such relations; elements and words are abstractions. Early in life and in unfamiliar situations, meaning is introduced through ostensive or, more generally, extralingual relations, i. e." t by pointing toward labeled objects and qualities. or by directing or performing requested actions. These extra lingual relations represent, however, exceptional circumstances for depicting the meaning of objects, events, or qualities. Regularly, such information will be substituted by intralingual relations. We will, for example, explicate the meaning of ZEBRA by saying that it "is an ANIMAL, has STRIPES, is found in AFRICA, is like a HORSE, etc." rather than by pointing at one.
Such explications presuppose that the listener has already acquired a repertoire of relational expressions so that he may insert the new information into the network available to him. This is achieved,for ins t.an ce ; by both relating and differentiating ZEBRA from other ANIMALS, by grouping ZEBRA into its spatial location, by recognizing the criterialattributes of ZEBRA, etc. Undoubtedly, the meaning of ZEBRA. as explicated through these relational statements, is incomplete (e.g., for zoological purposes) and subjective both in regard to the speaker and the listener. There is no assurance but, in principle, doubt that both will imply precisely the same understanding of the term. ZEBRA for one might denote a dangerous beast, for the other a handsome creature.
In spite of these idiosyncratic interpretations, communication is possible as long as, within a limited group of speakers, major sections of such a relational structure are being shared. Individuals will communicate within the boundaries of such networks by attending to subsections, such as those included in our example above. Under still more limited conditions (e.g., if only the information "ANIMAL with STRIPES" is transmitted leading in turn to multiple interpretations, such as ZEBRA, TIGER or HYENA), the need may arise to extend the subset within the relational network by including references to specific locations, i.e~, AFRICA or INDIA, to types, i.e., HORSE or CAT, etc. In other words, the domain of the relational structure will vary along numerous dimensions, such as individuals (abilities, age), groups (language, sex, occupation), situations (school, job site, cocktail party), etc. Theoretically, the structure can always be extended to make a disambiguation possible. The repertoire of linguistic expressions is rich enough or can always be enriched to make identifications possible.
Our last remarks call attention to the fluctuating and shifting state of relational structures. Such conditions are characteristic, in particular, of languages. The example used by Carnap (1928, pp. 25-27) , Le., that of a railroad network, is less convincing in this regard, because it seems unreasonable to consider this structure, L, e.. , the system of railroad tracks, as anything but fixed. To depict this structure by activities, i.e., by the moving trains, would be unusual. Language, however, might well be regarded as a system of activities. Its underlying neuroanatomical organization is known only in its grossest features and any particular nervous impulse may reach a cortical destination simultaneously along many alternative tracks, Moreover, neither the source nor the destination are firmly fixed. Thus, neither the tracks (relations) nor the intersections (elements) are firmly fixed. In most psychological and sociological interpretations, however, the notion of fixed structures has been given preference. Traditionally language, too, has been regarded as a system of elements (words) and connections (associations), but rarely as a system of transformed energies.
Language has always been regarded as an objectified product but not as transformational labor. With this example, we are also led, once more, to our earlier contrastive comparison between the major trend in Gestalt psychology and Piaget, the former emphasizing the priority of organized structure, the latter the transformational activity. This trend is most clearly expressed in DUrkheim's concept of "collective images" and "collective mind," both of which are psychological terms generalized to sociology. Everything social consists of images or is the product of images. Although these images cannot be reduced to physical conditions, man exists, at the same time, as a physical being. Thus, DUrkheim supports a distinct dualism: Man is both an individual physical and a communal social being. If one were to approach a study of psychology at all, it would have to consist either of psychophysiology or of psychosociology. The object for sociology, on the other hand, the collective mind, is independent of the individual and his consciousness. nUrkheim, together with Mauss (1903) , applied this conceptualization to the study of intellectual functions. Logical categories were seen as originating from social relations. The concept of space, for example, was derived from the notion of social territory and forces. Similarly, Halbwachs (1925 Halbwachs ( . 1950 proposes individual psychology as a third approach. For example, the study of perception has to be concerned with collective aspects insofar as it deals with general concepts, such as "book,1t "table," etc. On the other hand, it has to be .concerned with neurophysiological and anatomical conditions, equally general and common to all human beings. But finally, the study of perception also has to be concerned with experiences that are unique for an individual.
It is on this last issue that Blondel deviates from DUrkheim's dualistic conception and reintroduces psychology as a third form of exploration.
Blondel's deviation from DUrkheim was criticized by Halbwachs (1929) for fa~ling to recognize sufficiently the formative role of social customs, habits, and concepts. An individual outside of society, Halbwachs maintains.
would not be able to function generatively. The discrepancy between these two ways of thinking becomes most apparent in Blondel' s analysis of volition.
On the one hand, volition originates from biological r ef Lexes , on the other, it represents an act which is distinctly social in nature. Although genetic connection does not exist between these two forms of volition, there exists.
in between, an individual will which is psychological in nature and free.
Of course, most people do not develop such a tendency; they are solely directed by collective volition to which "they subject themselves "obediently" and by their biological drives to which they submit themselves in an equally "obedient" manner. Only the intellectual "elite" is capable of developing individual volition.
Blondel's interpretations share basic features with the cultural anthropology of Levy-BrUhl (1922) and, although they are nongenetic, they are: similar to the cognitive developmental psychology of the early Piaget (1928) .
Levy-BrUhl adopts from DUrkheim the concept of the collective images. But while DUrkheim postulates a "collective subject" as the carrier of these images, Levy-BrUhl rejects such a metaphysical construct. For Levy-BrUhl "collective images," although they are determined by the society, are conceptions of and located in the individual. Closely in line with Blonde1's distinction, Levy-BrUhl investigates different levels of the collective mind.
He isknown·for his study of the "primitive mind," which he contrasts sharply with that of modern man without emphasizing--as DUrkheim did--the continuity in the development of the human race and human consciousness.
In more recent years, these different trends--as convincingly shown by Leach (1970) -~merge into the functionalism of anthropologists like Malinowski (1926) and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss (1958) . It is also at this juncture that one of Piaget's (1928) early contributions attains significance.
Piaget tries to resolve the conflict between DUrkheim's emphasis of the continuity in the development of man and .Levy-BrUhl's emphasis upon qualitative differences by elaborating his famous distinction between functions and schemata. Functions remain the same throughout the stages of human evolution and individual development; schemata change~like organs in the evolution of species~or forms of logical operations in the development of the individual. In both cases, functions and schemata complement one another; functions do not exist without schemata and schemata do not exist without functions.
In his early writings, Piaget (especially 1923, 1924) These were also the years when he contributed his interpretations of the development of language functions in terms of egocentric and socialized speech which were rebutted by Vigotsky (1962) . In his later writings~Piaget abandoned his emphasis upon the impact of social conditions~however~and increasingly focused his attention upon psychic structures and functions.
Thus the antithesis to the viewpoints emerging from the followers of Both 's equence s are bound to coincide because both are the product of human efforts.
The principle of progression by qualitative leaps is closely related to that~I dialect{c interpenetration. It resembles Piaget's description of cognd ti~e development, though-it emphas izes the interaction between psychic activity and outer, material cultural-historical conditions rather than intra-psychic shifts captured by Piaget's dialectic contrast of assimilation and accommodation. As our previous examples imply, dialectic leaps are brought about by.human activity. Thus, the invention of tools, of linguistic expressions, or of language in general, changes dramatically the sociocultural conditions under Which human beings are growing up.
Inversely, as these sociocultural conditions have come into existence during the history of mankind, they will induce upon the organism stepwise changes, each reflecting basic reorganizations of the oeprations which the individual will be able to perform, e.g., to speak, to write, to formalize, etc.
Our last statements indicate, once more, the intimate connections between functional changes produced by human activities and the structural shifts representing the products of these activities. Thus, our discussion returns to the interpretations advanced by Piaget. The interactive process of shifts is not restricted to the activities of the individual, however, but embraces all other individuals in his social world, nay, all individuals who through their ceaseless efforts over generations have created the cultural-historical conditions under which any present-day descendent grows up and, thus, lives.
During the third and most recent period in the short history of Soviet psychology, a double interaction theory has been proposed by S. L. Rubinstejn (1958, 1963; for English discussions see Payne, 1968; Riegel, 1972a, b; Wozniak, 1972 Of course, these evaluations also indicate an intrinsic strength of psychology. Psychology, more than biology and sociology, is or ought to be concerned with activities rather than with products. This conciusion, once more, returns our attention to the comparison of structure and function.
Rubinstejn agrees with Piaget by emphasizing the mutual dependence of both;
he disagrees with him (at least with Piaget's writings during the forties and fifties) by emphasizing that the structure-function relationship ought not to be limited to the activities of the separate individual but ought to be extended to the interactions within his cultural-historical world.
He disagrees, furthermore, with Piaget by trying to trace the two interactions to their material foundations.
Concluding Remarks
In our last section. Piaget's developmental structuralism was submerged within Rubinstejn'sdouble interaction theory. Such an interpretation seems to handle all those issues proposed in opposition to the traditional mechanistic viewpoints of American psychology. i.e., issues which focus upon the active organism in an active environment. However, in contradiction to their dialectic foundation, Soviet psychologists have emphasized the material bases of psychic processes. Thus, they have emphasized the products rather than the activities that generate them. In concluding our t re atLs e , we will direct our attention to alternative interpretations and review, once more, the trends and options of modern psychology. Husser1. In spite of their wide differences, all of these scholars built their interpretations upon sensation and perception as the basis for knowledge.
The world around us came to be regarded as a mere outward projection of the mind. Psychology became the· most fundamental of all sciences.
Wh~le for the first group of scholars knowledge was to be gained through sensory experience and contemplations based upon them, a second school of thought, associated with the advances in the natural sciences, began to emphasize the constructive aspects of knowledge. According to Russell and Carnap, physics and astronomy, for example, represent prototypes of constructive sciences whose founding components, unlike psychological sensations)
are not directly accessible to us but are intellectually generated. From this point of view, knowledge is founded upon the "sentence," in its German sense of "Satz" and "setzen." Knowledge is gained by proposing sentences rather than by receiving sensory information in a passive state.
Although related viewpoints were expressed early in psycho1ogy--for example in Brentano's Act-Psychology (l874)--they never attained an appreciation comparable to those based upon a sensory basis of knowledge. However, In contrast to earlier materialistic interpretations, they insist, however, that these conditions are not independent of the human organism; they are as much the product of human labor as they are forces impinging upon the human being. While Soviet psychologists opt for constructive theories, they abandon these theories all too soon "by emphasizing the objectified material products rather than the activities by which these products are generated. Piaget, on the other hand, while emphasizing activities rather than material products, restricts himself to the developing individual under exclusion of the cultural-historical activities within which the individual grows.
A synthesizing extension would have to emphasize perception, action, and organization both in the individual and in the society. By emphasizing the products, this theory would be structural; by emphasizing the activities, it would be transformationaL This theory would relate psychic activities both to their inner biological and their outer sociocultural foundations without
